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rescuers
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aUniversity of Leiden
ABSTRACT
The closure of ports to migrant rescue NGOs marked a turning point in
Italy’s approach to seaborne migrations across the Mediterranean. This
proﬁle article examines the legal, humanitarian and political implications
of this decision. Although closing ports is not necessarily unlawful under
maritime, human rights and European law, this policy entails severe
humanitarian externalities and may hardly help Italy’s call for structured,
long-term solidarity in addressing the challenge of large-scale maritime
migrations.
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Introduction
In June 2018, Italian Interior Minister Matteo Salvini declared Italian
ports closed to NGO ships and foreign-ﬂagged merchant vessels carry-
ing migrants rescued oﬀ the shore of Libya. Such a decision marked a
turning point in Italy’s approach to seaborne migrations across the
Mediterranean. This proﬁle article sheds light on the legal, humanitarian
and political implications of closing ports.
To this end, the article is divided as follows. The ﬁrst section outlines
the context underlying the new Italian government’s stance. The second
examines Italy’s approach from a legal standpoint, acknowledging that
the closure of Italian ports does not directly violate maritime, human
rights and European law. The third section demonstrates that although
not necessarily illegal, this decision deters NGOs and merchant vessels
from conducting search and rescue (SAR) operations, threatening severe
humanitarian consequences. The concluding section examines the con-
sequences of the closure of Italian ports for European Union (EU)
asylum and migration policy, arguing that this confrontational approach
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may not help Italy’s need for long-term, EU-wide solidarity in addressing
seaborne migratory ﬂows.
From the code of conduct to the closing of ports
On 10 June, Italian Interior Minister Matteo Salvini declared that non-gov-
ernmental organizations (NGOs) ships like SOS-Mediterranée’s Aquarius,
which was carrying 629 people rescued oﬀshore Libya, would not be
allowed to disembark migrants in Italy. As the arrival of large numbers of
asylum seekers entails logistical challenges and can only occur where hot-
spots for migrants’ identiﬁcation are available, the Interior Ministry eﬀec-
tively enjoys a veto power over the disembarkation of migrants on Italian
territory. Although unprecedented, Salvini’s decision did not emerge out of
nowhere, but is the culmination of previous attempts to limit NGOs’ activ-
ities. Since late 2016, frustration with insuﬃcient EU-wide solidarity in
shouldering the reception of asylum seekers and widespread criticism that
NGOs acted as a pull factor and facilitated human smugglers turned public
opinion against non-governmental maritime rescue operations, informing
the misleading impression that foreign charities were responsible for a
dramatic increase in migrant arrivals to Italy. In May 2017, then
Democratic Party Interior Minister Marco Minniti urged NGOs to sign a
code of conduct which imposed several limitations on rescuing operations,
and threatened the closure of Italian ports to non-signatory organizations
(Cusumano, 2017). The Democratic Party-led government, however, never
followed through on this threat. Soon after his appointment as new Interior
Minister, League secretary Salvini seized the ﬁrst opportunity to deploy the
ready-made prohibition to access Italian ports, using the ban of NGOs to
showcase his hardline anti-immigration stance. Rallying the electorate
against large-scale migratory ﬂows was a crucial component of Salvini’s
strategy to turn a regionalist party like former secretary Bossi’s Northern
League into a party enjoying nation-wide support like the French Front
National.
The closure of Italian ports left the Aquarius without any place to dis-
embark the migrants. The newly elected Spanish prime minister Sanchez’s
announcement that migrants would be welcome in Valencia came as an
unexpected gift to the Italian Interior minister, who had deployed the threat
to close Italy’s ports in the attempt of forcing Malta to open theirs. Valletta,
however, refused to cave in. Due to its small size and modest resources,
Malta is both ﬁrmly committed to avoid serving as a place of disembarkation
and unable to provide any meaningful support in shouldering the migration
crisis. Sanchez’s willingness to welcome migrants in Valencia made the
Italian government coalition able to claim that the decision to close ports
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paid oﬀ in obtaining the EU-wide burden sharing in hosting asylum seekers
that Rome had previously failed to obtain.
Unsurprisingly, the prohibition to use Italian ports for the disembarkation
of migrants was soon replicated with the German NGO Mission Lifeline,
which had rescued 259 migrants oﬀshore Libya. After spending one week
adrift at sea, the Lifeline was ﬁnally authorized entry in Valletta after the
Maltese government obtained the guarantee that no future disembarkations
would follow and migrants would be shared with Italy and other European
countries. Even Italian armed forces’ ships encountered resistance to dis-
embark rescued migrants. Most notably, the Italian Coast Guard unit Diciotti
had to wait until 27 August before receiving the authorization to disembark
177 migrants rescued 11 days before (see Table 1).
The legality of closing ports
The main legal question pertaining to the Aquarius and Lifeline incidents, as
well as any future disembarkation standoﬀs, concerns which state bears
responsibility for the disembarkation of migrants rescued at sea. Three
legal regimes shed light on this question but oﬀer no clear answer: the
law of the sea, human rights law, and European Union law.
Maritime law
The main rule concerning the disembarkation of persons rescued at sea is set
out in Section 3.1.9 of the 1979 Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue
(SAR Convention). It stipulates that the state responsible for the SAR region
(SRR) in which assistance is rendered has the primary responsibility to ensure
cooperation and coordination to disembark survivors in a place of safety. If
the authorities in charge of a SRR are unavailable, however, the responsibility
to coordinate SAR operations is temporarily transferred to the ﬁrst Maritime
Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) that receives information on the distress
situation. Since 2013, distress calls along the Central Mediterranean route
were systematically redirected to Italy, which ultimately took over the respon-
sibility of coordinating all SAR operations oﬀshore Libya.
In December 2017, Tripoli’s Government of National Accord (GNA) sub-
mitted materials to the International Maritime Organization with a view to
oﬃcially establishing a SRR, a process which formally came to conclusion by
the end of June 2018. The GNA, however, did not yet (and still does not)
possess a fully proﬁcient MRCC. For this reason, the rescue conducted by the
Aquarius was still coordinated by Italian authorities. At least in the Aquarius
case, Rome’s MRCC can arguably be considered as the rescue coordination
centre exercising primary responsibility in the sense of Section 3.1.9. In the
past, the MRCC in Rome consistently responded to the impossibility to ﬁnd
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alternative places of safety for migrants rescued oﬀshore Libya during
operations conducted under its coordination by allowing for disembarkation
in an Italian port. This course of action, however, is not strictly dictated by
maritime legal obligations. When Section 3.1.9 was inserted into the SAR
Convention in 2004, most states indicated they did not want any ‘residual’
rule pointing at a state that would eventually have to accept disembarkation
onto its territory (Coppens & Somers, 2010, p. 392). Consequently, coordi-
nating a SAR operation does not necessarily oblige Italy or any other country
to accept rescued migrants in its territory if alternative places of safety are
available.
Human rights law
Under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) states have an
obligation to secure the rights and freedoms of the Convention for ‘every-
one within their jurisdiction’. Protection under the ECHR is relevant for the
disembarkation of migrants in that denying access to ports may aﬀect the
right to life, the prohibition of inhumane treatment and the prohibition of
refoulement for those on board (Moreno-Lax, 2017).
In the context of Italy refusing access to its ports, however, it is doubtful
whether the NGO vessels came within the jurisdiction of Italy for the
purpose of the ECHR. To be considered within Italian jurisdiction, the vessel
and the people on board – whether de jure, de facto, or both – had to be
either within an area under the eﬀective control of Italy, or under direct
Italian state agents’ control. Absent indications proving that the NGO vessels
came within the jurisdiction of Italy, protection under the ECHR is less
obvious. For example, giving directions to vessels – even in the absence of
the legal power to give binding instructions – might constitute a contribut-
ing element of de facto jurisdiction, but these kinds of arguments have yet
to be addressed by judges in Strasbourg or elsewhere.
EU law
The EU has no competence to regulate SAR operations. The Sea Borders
Regulation contains provisions related to disembarkation, but only applies
to the operations at sea of the European Border Agency Frontex. The opera-
tional plans and status of forces agreement applying to the EU maritime
missions Triton and EUNAVFOR Med explicitly state that rescued migrants
should be disembarked in Italy. After Italian insistence, the operational plans
applying to Frontex’s new mission Themis no longer mention Italy as the sole
place of disembarkation but stipulate that migrants should be taken to the
nearest EU port. As SAR operations involving private vessels, however, the
Aquarius and Lifeline incidents fall outside the scope of these rules.
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A possibility for EU law to apply nonetheless is if the NGO vessels had
proceeded to Italian waters. Once de jure in the Italian territorial sea,
migrants aboard NGO vessels would have found themselves within the
geographical scope of application of the EU Asylum Procedures Directive,
which sets common procedures for EU Member States for granting and
withdrawing international protection. Another avenue for the applicability
of EU law is oﬀered by the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The latter,
however, only applies if Member States are ‘implementing EU law’. This
raises the question of whether Italy was implementing EU law when order-
ing NGO vessels not to enter its waters and refusing them a place for
disembarkation. Italy’s actions could be construed as a form of border
control pursuant to the Schengen Borders Code and, therefore, trigger the
applicability of the EU Charter, which contains similar fundamental rights as
those enshrined by the abovementioned ECHR. Whether the Schengen
Borders Code applies to such extraterritorial situations is, however, an
unresolved issue (Fink, Gombeer, & Rijpma, 2018).
Eventually, the migrants on the Aquarius and the Lifeline were trans-
ported to Spain and Malta. This kind of arrangement leaves the application
of the Dublin rules unaﬀected (i.e. Spain and Malta being the ﬁrst EU
country of arrival responsible for the asylum application).
The humanitarian implications of closing ports
Although not illegal under maritime, human rights and European law, the
decision to close Italian ports has problematic humanitarian implications.
Since the launching of operation Mare Nostrum in October 2013, Italy
willingly allowed for the disembarkation in its territory of all the migrants
rescued in the Maltese and Libyan SRR. Even if Mare Nostrum was discon-
tinued after 1 year, Italy’s commitment to keep its ports open remained
unaltered, allowing other actors to continue conducting SAR operations.
NGOs too took advantage of the possibility to disembark those rescued in
nearby Italian ports to ﬁll the gap in SAR capabilities created by the
insuﬃcient presence of European Navy and Coast Guard ships oﬀshore
Libya (Cusumano, 2017). The fact that Italy has now joined Malta in making
its ports unavailable for the disembarkation of migrants has ultimately made
most NGOs’ rescue operations impossible.
Even if Spain were to maintain ports open, its coasts are too far to
provide a reliable place of safety for those rescued in the Central
Mediterranean. Disembarking migrants in Valencia forced the Aquarius –
the fastest and largest NGO vessel – to sail across the Mediterranean for
several days, escorted by an Italian Navy and an Italian Coast Guard ship.
Disembarkation in ports at the Northern end of the Mediterranean basin
would not only impose additional hardship on migrants, but also force
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NGOs to spend long periods away from the area where most distress
situations occur and entail lengthy routes and large fuel costs that small
organizations are simply unable to face.
By rescuing over 40% of the migrants assisted in 2017 and 2018, NGOs have
become crucial providers of SAR, rescuing over 110,000 people since 2015
(Cusumano, 2017). The fact that Frontex and Italian Navy assets have been
withdrawn further North made NGO presence all the more important, increas-
ing the risk that their disappearance may translate into a surge of deaths at
sea. The closure of Italian ports to merchant vessels too further magniﬁes this
gap in SAR capabilities, causing delays and lengthy deviations that may
discourage shipmasters from conducting SAR operations. Although the CSDP
mission EUNAVFOR and Italian authorities have assisted the GNA in rebuilding
a functioning Libyan Coast Guard and Navy (LCGN), Tripoli’s forces are still
unable to conduct SAR operations eﬀectively and independently. The fact that
migrants often resist being taken back to Libya makes LCGN SAR operations all
the more problematic from both legal and practical standpoints, and has
repeatedly translated into the loss of life and use of violence against migrants.
The current unpreparedness of the Libyan Coast Guard, the diﬃculties
attached to safely returning migrants to Libya, and the fragility of the GNA
makes NGOs’ presence valuable as both rescuers and whistle-blowers of
human rights violations. As forcefully illustrated by quantitative evidence,
NGOs’ disengagement may have already caused severe humanitarian extern-
alities. June 2018 saw a sharp increase in the deadliness of the journey. Despite
the drop in the number of crossings, recorded deaths oﬀshore Libya between
June and 19 July 2018 amounted to at least 705, more than the previous six
months combined (Villa, Gruijters, and Steinhilper 2018).
The political implications of closing ports
Humanitarian concerns aside, the closure of ports may also be short-sighted
in pursuing Italy’s national interest. Although one might be tempted to see
Italy’s new policy as a successful gamble, a deeper examination of Italy’s
predicament suggests otherwise. Even if France were to follow Spain in
opening a port on a one-oﬀ basis, the occasional disembarkation of few
hundred migrants in other European countries is hardly helpful for Italy,
which had over 180,000 asylum seekers disembarked in its ports in 2016
only. Rome’s move came at the price of considerable diplomatic tension
with Malta, France and Spain, which criticized the closure of Italian ports as
illegal, cynical and even ‘disgusting’. The Italian government is not entirely
oﬀ the mark in dismissing European partners who showed little solidarity in
sharing Rome’s burden as hypocritical. A viable, long-term solution to Italy’s
problem, however, inevitably requires European allies’ support in reforming
the EU asylum system.
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As epitomized by several EU member states’ willingness to accept the
relocation of 300 people disembarked in Sicily on 15 July, the humanitarian
imperative to give rescue vessels access ports and Italy’s need to oﬄoad part of
the burden associated with migrants’ reception to other countries are not
necessarily irreconcilable. The ensuing 27 August standoﬀ, when 177 migrants
rescued by the Italian Coast Guard vessel 18 had to wait 11 days at sea before
disembarking, shows that the threat of closing ports to rescuers hardly helps in
obtaining EU burden sharing. Any eﬀort to obtain solidarity on a more sys-
tematic basis, however, inevitably requires reforming the Dublin regulation,
exempting countries that accept the disembarkation ofmigrants rescued at sea
from the obligation to process all their asylum applications through the estab-
lishment of eﬀective relocation mechanisms. As of July 2018, Italy received
ﬁnancial help from the EU through the Refugee Fund, but only obtained the
relocation of 12,694 migrants as of 9 July 2018.
The conclusions of the European Council in 28 June show that the closure
of ports hardly helped Italy’s call for relocating larger number of migrants.
While acknowledging the need for greater solidarity on paper, the docu-
ment primarily focuses on the need for ‘more eﬀective control of the EU’s
external borders’, and contains no concrete provisions ensuring greater
burden sharing in the reception of asylum seekers. On the contrary, the
Council departed from previous eﬀorts to establish compulsory quotas for
the transfer of asylum-seekers to other member states, stressing that reloca-
tions should only occur ‘on a voluntary basis’. The disappearance of com-
pulsory quotas from the Council conclusions and the lukewarm interests in
reforming the Dublin system displayed by the new Italian cabinet suggests
that Rome may be willing to give up on asylum seekers’ relocations in
exchange for greater support in the protection and externalization of EU
Southern borders. As illustrated by their pledge to ‘step up support’ for the
LCGN and the statement that ‘all vessels operating in the Mediterranean
must . . . not obstruct operations of the Libyan Coastguard’, other EU mem-
bers may have already given their blessing to this strategy. Libya’s state
fragility and legal constraints, however, call into question both the appro-
priateness and the eﬀectiveness of this course of action. North African
countries’ refusal to serve as ports of disembarkation and the principle of
non-refoulement, for instance, cast doubts over the prospect to establish
‘regional disembarkation platforms’ in cooperation with third countries
vaguely mentioned in the Council conclusions. The possibility that Italy’s
on-going training and ﬁnancial, logistical and operational support to LCGN
may be construed as a push-back by proxy by the European Court of Human
Rights further hinders the viability of this strategy.
Arrivals to Italy in the ﬁrst 6 months of 2018 amounted to around 17,000,
plummeting by 80% compared with the previous year. This decline, which
started when a large number of NGOs ships were still deployed at sea, does
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not only call into question the pull factor criticism, conﬁrming that non-
governmental SAR operations had no signiﬁcant impact on the magnitude
of migratory ﬂows. Such a sharp drop in migrant arrivals also makes the
present closure of Italian ports at the price of diplomatic frictions and
humanitarian externalities all the more unwarranted. Although the pyrrhic
victory over the Aquarius and Lifeline resonated with Italians’ frustration,
strengthening the new government coalition, these standoﬀs appear little
more than electoral stunts disguised as foreign policy. By alienating allies
and dilapidating the political capital built by rescuing migrants despite the
glaring lack of EU solidarity, Italy’s new approach to seaborne migrations
may only make a long-term solution to the crisis all the more unlikely,
leaving Italy in deep waters like the NGO ships it closed its ports to.
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